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Admiral on Special Duty with Commander in Chief of the Kriegsmarine
[Konteradmiral Wagner]
Conference of the Commander in Chief, Navy, with the Führer on 16 March 1945 at 1600.
(Note: The Commander in Chief, Navy, did not attend the führer conferences on 14 and 15 March 1945.
1. The Chief of the OKW, Operations Staff [Generaloberst Jodl] reports to the Führer on the situation in northern Norway. While the delivery of supplies generally runs smoothly, the coal situation in Norway is constantly becoming more critical. At the moment there are still 15,000 tons of coal in Denmark, ready to be shipped to Norway. After that, no more coal shipments from Germany can be counted on unless the Navy can find ways and means to provide further quantities. The railway schedule in Norway will shortly be reduced to two trains per day because of the coal shortage. This rate can be maintained even after conversion to wood fueling. In connection with the coal situation, the Commander in Chief, Navy, states that as long as coal is available in German rorts, sea transportation will present no difficulties. Transportation on land, however, is causing difficulties. Coal shipments on the Dortmund-Ems Canal are to be resumed as soon as possible in spite of renewed damages to the Ladbergen sector. The Commander in Chief, Navy, decided with Ministerialdirektor Dorsch that a dump truck railway should be built to serve temporarily until an efficient narrow-gauge railway can be provided. First of all a large labor force will be needed to reload the coal. But the coal transported in this way will probably be needed in the coastal areas of the homeland, since there also coal is very scarce, and our transport and escort forces never have enough.
2. On 15 March the Führer ordered that the Navy accelerate the transfer of the 169th Infantry Division from Norway to Jutland with all available means. The Commander in Chief, Navy, reports that two more transports were assigned to this task, and that adequate escort forces are also available; therefore the transfer of this division will be effected as rapidly as possible. About four fifths of the division is already in Denmark.
3. The Commander in Chief, Navy, reports to the Führer that the first submarine, Type XXI, will depart for the operational area within the next few days. Six more submarines of this type will follow in April. The Commander in Chief, Navy, intends to send one group of the eight to ten boats of Type IX C - to be ready for action at the end of March or beginning of April - to patrol the convoy route to America. According to reports received from our ships there is no more enemy air patrol west of 15º West.
Therefore it would be to our advantage to invade this area with submarines as soon as possible in order to make successful surprise attacks on the one hand, and on the other hand to weaken the enemy's present concentration of defense weapons in the sea area around Britain.
Recent happenings indicate that most of our submarine losses are due to enemy mines. The best way of overcoming this would be to operate in shallow water. The enemy will refrain from using ground mines because of the danger to his own shipping, and it is unlikely that moored mines will be laid in shallow water. At the same time the shallow water will provide for our ships the best protection against enemy radar. However should a submarine be located in this area, it will have difficulty escaping enemy sub-chasing vessels.
4. The Commander in Chief, Navy, presents to the Führer with the aid of a map his ideas about the organization of the shipment of supplies by sea. While this organization functioned smoothly and satisfactorily in normal times, difficulties and frictions have arisen now that the isolation of Army Groups Kurland, North, and of the 2nd Army has brought about increased demands. The Commander in Chief, Navy, believes that the fullest cooperation of all interested parties will achieve maximum efficiency. It is a matter of making rapid reassignments of ships already at sea, thus assuring quick delivery of supplies whenever new needs arise. While delays due to enemy interference and weather conditions can scarcely be overcome more efficiently than is the case at this time, the Commander in Chief, Navy, believes that the situation could be improved by more efficient assignment of ships and by speeding up the loading process in the harbors. Therefore he requests that the Transport and Supply Office, Scandinavia, be put under the command of the Navy. After the Commander in Chief, Navy, affirmed the Führer's inquiry as to whether he expected a more rapid supply delivery from such a new regulation, the Führer decides in favor of the suggestion and signs the following order:
"The Office of Supply and Transport, Scandinavia, with its subordinated branches is released from the command authority of the OKW and put under the Naval Staff, Commanding Officer, Supply and Transport for the Armed Forces. Executive orders will be issued by the Chief of the OKW in cooperation with the Commander in Chief, Navy. (This order will be released by the OKW, which will thereupon make suggestions for the executive orders to the Commander in Chief, Navy, and the Seekriegsleitung.)
5. The Commander in Chief, Navy, reports to the Führer that in case Danzig and Gotenhafen are lost, he does not plan to destroy these harbors completely, but merely to block them as effectively as possible. While the port of Danzig, being a river port, cannot be completely eliminated by mere demolition, also Gotenhafen would, in spite of the most thorough demolition, still provide sufficient harbor space for the small requirements of the Russians. Therefore it would seem more practical to forego demolition altogether and to concentrate on blocking the ports with deep mine fields. However it is essential that the minor basins south of the main harbor of Gotenhafen be completely demolished. The same holds true for Pillau and Königsberg. The Führer agrees with this suggestion. In conclusion the Commander in Chief, Navy, again stresses the decisive value the ports of the Bay of Danzig have for German naval as well as land warfare in this area.
6. The Chief of the Army General Staff [Generaloberst Guderian] suggests assigning an Army officer as fortification commander for Gotenhafen. The Commander in Chief, Navy, agrees, since the fortification is in greater danger from land than from the sea, and it is therefore essential that the chief responsibility for the defense lies in the hands of the Army. Naval matters are to be managed by the officer up to now in command of the fortification, in his new capacity as Naval Shore Commander, West Prussia.
7. The Commander in Chief, Navy, points out to the Chief of the Army General Staff that he cannot accept the complaints of the Fortification Commander, Kolberg, about the supposed failure of the Navy concerning the evacuation of refugees from Kolberg. He believes that the evacuation of over 60,000 refugees within twelve days by improvised means is quite exceptional and will hold its own against all criticism. The Chief of the OKW informs the Commander in Chief, Navy, that he is of the same opinion.
8. In a conversation with Field Marshal Busch, the new Commanding General of the Operations Staff, North Coast, the Commander in Chief, Navy, stresses the necessity of leaving the overall command authority of the immediate coastal area in the hands of the naval commanders, since experiences in the West Area proved that they are better qualified to handle the operation of weapons along the coast.
Admiral on Special Duty with Commander in Chief of the Kriegsmarine
[Konteradmiral Wagner]
Conference of the Commander in Chief, Navy, with the Führer on 17 March 1945 at 1600.
1. The Chief of the Army General Staff [Generaloberst Guderian] expresses to the Comnander in Chief, Navy, the opinion that the Führer's decision to hold Kurland can partly be traced back to his concern for naval warfare. The Chief of the Army General Staff therefore requests that the Commander in Chief, Navy, support him in his endeavor to evacuate Kurland. Though the Commander in Chief, Navy, is convinced that problems of naval warfare did not influence the Führer's decision, he nevertheless sees the necessity to clarify this problem. He reports to the Führer that West Prussia is now as ever of prime importance for naval warfare, but that the Navy purely from a viewpoint of naval strategy has no interest in the defense of Kurland. The shipment of supplies to Kurland is only a strain on the Navy. The Führer confirms the correctness of this opinion and explains at length the reasons - all based purely on considerations of land warfare - which made him decide not to abandon Kurland. In the course of the conversation the Commander in Chief, Navy, states in answer to a question by the Führer that it would take the Navy about five weeks to evacuate five divisions. According to rough estimates about 2,000 men, 600 horses, and 300 vehicles could be shipped every day. The Führer delegates the Commander in Chief, Navy, to investigate these problems again in the light of present conditions.
2. Reporting on the transport situation in Norway, the Commander in Chief, Navy, mentions that soon three additional ships will be assigned to the transport service to make up for the loss of the transports MARKOBRUNNER and TIJUNKA , which were damaged by mines.
3. The Commander in Chief, Navy, reports to the Führer that the harbor patrol vessel No. 31 (a small boat about 16 m. long with one machine gun and a crew of one noncommissioned officer and five men), escaped to Sweden after the officer had been shot. One member of the crew returned in a rubber dinghy. It is probably the action of a madman. The Foreign Office is requested to demand the extradition of the escaped crew.
4. On the basis of a communication from the Commanding Admiral, Eastern Baltic, transmitted via Naval Command, East, the Commander in Chief, Navy, calls the attention of the Chief of the Army General Staff to the fact that the maintenance of the bridgeheads at Danzig, Gotenhafen, and Hela depend above all on weapons and ammunition, and he requests therefore that adequate supplies be made available.
5. After the conference the Reich Commissioner of Shipping, Gauleiter Kaufmann, in the presence of the Führer and the Commander in Chief, Navy, reports on problems of logistics and the shipment of supplies and coal to Norway. No new angles are disclosed.
Admiral on Special Duty with Commander in Chief of the Kriegsmarine
[Konteradmiral Wagner]
Conference of the Commander in Chief, Navy, with the Führer on 18 March 1945 at 1600.
1. The Chief of the OKW, Operations Staff, Generaloberst [Alfred] Jodl reports that the main body of enemy air reconnaissance has been shifted from the Nijmegen region toward the northeast, which points to certain conclusions as to the intended direction of enemy attack. In this connection the Commander in Chief, Navy, reports to the Führer that in the area of the German Bight and in the Skagerrak the enemy is continuing to lay mines set for two weeks and that he has laid no mines in the Ems estuary and in the Dollart. This points to the conclusion that the enemy wants to keep these areas open temporarily for his own movements, and that enemy landings, especially in the Ems estuary, are very possible.
2. It was learned from American sources that the big railroad bridge at Remagen has collapsed, allegedly owing to previous damage. The Commander in Chief, Navy, takes this opportunity to give the Führer an idea of the repeated attempts by naval detachments to destroy this bridge under the most difficult circumstances.
3. In reply to the Führer's inquiry of 17 March about the transportation possibilities from Kurland, the Commander in Chief, Navy, submits the following report:
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a. The Navy can spare 28 ships with a total of 110,729 BRT for the evacuation of Kurland, at the same time keeping up shipments of current supply needs, continuing with the evacuation of troops from Norway on the present scale, and evacuating the wounded and the refugees.
b. In one round trip these ships can handle 23,250 men, 4,520 horses, and 3,160 vehicles.
c. Taking into consideration possible delays caused by weather conditions or enemy interference, one round trip between Libau and Swinemünde takes an average of nine days.
d. The harbors of Libau and Swinemünde will be adequate to handle these transports, provided that all transports carrying wounded and refugees are unloaded in harbors other than Swinemünde.
e. This is possible only if the coal supply for the transport ships, convoy escort forces, and repair shipyards is the same as heretofore.
f. The above figures do not take into account any exceptional intensification of enemy activity which might result in heavy losses in shipping and destruction of harbors, since this sort of thing cannot be estimated in advance.
4. The Führer informs Minister Speer that he has decided to continue the production of ammunition for heavy ship artillery within the frame of the emergency program. (Figures covering production capacity and need are being compiled at present.)
5. Following the report on the launching of the first submarine of Type XXI, the Commander in Chief, Navy, informs the Führer of the very good results that were reported by the commander of a submarine Type XXIII, Oberleutnant zur See Heckel. After the attack he withdrew at a speed of 9 knots, changed over to crawling speed, and succeeded in escaping from the anti-submarine forces; they dropped their depth charges without effect far away from the submarine. Furthermore, the Commander in Chief, Navy, emphasized once more that our figures of German submarine successes as they are published are no doubt smaller than the actual results. Assuming that the missing submarines averaged as well as those which returned, an additional 26,000 tons may have been sunk. The submarines could do even better if we were still in the possession of the harbors in the Bay of Biscay.
6. In connection with the report on the S-boat missions during the night of 17 March, the Commander in Chief, Navy, calls attention to the great activity of the S-boats lately. Some time ago he had been under the impression that the Commander, S-Boats had become somewhat too dogmatic in the use of his forces, although one must be very careful about establishing any set rules, considering the changing conditions and experiences. These difficulties now seem to have been overcome.
7. During a discussion of possible enemy plans in the Mediterranean Sea, the Commander in Chief, Navy, states that the observations of enemy ship movements through the Strait of Gibraltar are of no real value, because no one knows either whether the troop ships are carrying replacements or men on furlough, or whether the convoys remain in the Mediterranean or go on to East Asia.
8. The The Chief of the OKW, Operations Staff [Generaloberst Jodl] informs the Commander in Chief, Navy, that the Commanding General, Armed Forces, West, has asked for permission to transfer the Naval Command, West, from Bad Schwalbach to Lindau on Lake Constance for reasons of air defense. The Commander in Chief, Navy, is of the opinion that the Naval Command, West, should remain in the vicinity of the Commanding General, Armed Forces, West. The The Chief of the OKW, Operations Staff intends to make his decision to this effect.
9. SS-Standartenführer [Wilhelm] Zander submits a request from Reichsleiter Bormann to relieve the congestion in Pillau somewhat by evacuating some 5,000 refugees, in addition to the main evacuation of refugees from West Prussia. The Commander in Chief, Navy, asks that the Party representative with the Naval Command, East, be given the necessary instructions; he will notify the Commanding officer, Supply and Transports of the measure himself.
10. The Chief of the Army General Staff informs the Commander in Chief, Navy, that Army Group, Vistula, has requested that the naval emergency regiments at the Dievenow front be incorporated into the 163rd Infantry Division and the 5th Light Infantry Division; these emergency units have fought very well, but they lack training and experience. The Commander in Chief, Navy, is of the opinion that the bulk of the emergency regiments should remain with the Navy as a naval infantry division. He is willing, however, to contribute part of the emergency units to bring one of the two army divisions up to strength. It is proposed to organize a new naval infantry division out of three naval emergency regiments and the core of the 163rd Infantry Division, which will go over to the Navy; in addition the 5th Light Infantry Division could be brought up to strength by means of an additional emergency regiment, which would be taken over by the Army. The Chief of the Army General Staff intends to examine the practicability of this solution.
Admiral on Special Duty with Commander in Chief of the Kriegsmarine
[Konteradmiral Wagner]
Conference of the Commander in Chief, Navy, with the Führer on 20 March 1945 at 1600.
(Note: The Commander in Chief, Navy, was not present at the Führer conference on 19 March 1945.)
1. On the basis of reports from agents, the Chief of the OKW, Operations Staff, states that the enemy will most likely make a combined air and sea landing in the area of the Ems estuary in the near future. The Führer, on the other hand, believes that the enemy will use his airborne troops nearer the front in direct support of an offensive by occupying bridges, crossroads and inportant points rather than in an independent strategic oporation. The Corunander in Chief, Navy, states that while the Ems is the most probable goal for a possiole landing, he is also of the opinion that a large independent landing operation is not likely at the morient. It is decided that two divisions will be transferred to the area of the Ems estuary. However, the 2nd Naval Infantry Division is to remain in its present assembly area and after being assembled it is to be transferred to the area near the front behind Army Group, Vistula, as planned heretofore.
2. In answer to the Führer's inquiry about participation of the task forces in the fighting around the Dohnas Mountain west of Gotenhafen, the Commander in Chief, Navy, shows him the report of the Admiral, Eastern Baltic Sea, according to which the ships' artillery has been in action against targets in this area every day since 10 March. On the decisive days of 17 and 18 March, however, comparatively little armunition was used. The demands of the Army, also concerning the use of ammunition, were almost entirely satisfied. The Führer is of the opinion that the Army did not make sufficient use of the very effective ships' artillery in the decisive fighting around the Dohnas Mountain.
3. The Northern Army Group reported that the transfer of the 4th Army with equipment from Rosenberg to Pillau can be accomplished in about five nights. According to the Führer's statements, the 4th Army is about 150,000 men strong. In this connection the Commander in Chief, Navy, reports that these figures reach far above the capacity of the Navy's equipment. According to latest íigures, the Navy can carry only 4,000 men per night without equipment. This number could be increased to 7,000 if more ships are assigned to this task. The Conmander in Chief, Navy, will report the exact figures on 21 March, as soon as his inquiries have been answered. The Commander in Chief, Navy, orders that as a precautioniary measure all naval barges available in the Baltic area are to be transferred at once to Pillau.
4. In answer to the Führer's inquiry, the Chief of Staff, Army, General [Walther] Buhle (Artillery) reports that 450 rounds of 28 cm. ammunition (4.1 caliber lengths) from a battery of Army Group, Vistula, can be made available for the SCHLESIEN and that the Army can furnish 394 rounds of 28 cm. ammunition (4.1 caliber lengths) and 2,556 rounds of armor piercing shells for the LÜTZOW. The Führer orders that this ammunition be given to the Navy immediately.
5. The Commander in Chief, Navy, reports to the Führer that he is going to try to reinforce the task force in Gotenhafen by transferring the LÜTZOW from Swinemünde. (The corresponding order of the Commander in Chief, Navy, effecting this transfer is telephoned to the Naval Command, Baltic, and the Seekriegsleitung, on the evening of 20 March.)
6. The Führer states that at the moment an adequate supply of ammunition is our most important task, even at the expense of troop transports. It would be useless to transfer more troops to the Northern Army Group before the shortage of ammunition there has been relieved. The Commander in Chief, Navy, reports in this connection that according to his observations no appreciable time can be saved during the transportation of ammunition to the ports, nor afterwards at sea, but only by correct assignment of the ships and accelerated turnover in the ports. This was also the reason why the Commander in Chief, Navy, requested that the Supply and Transportation Office, Scandinavia, be placed under the Commanding officer, Supply and Transports for the Armed Forces. (The Commanding Officer, Supply and Transports, is ordered to accelerate ammunition shipments to the Northern Army Group and especially to the 2nd Army in every way possible, even if other tasks must be postponed.)
7. With the help of a map, the Admiral on Special Duty with the Commander in Chief, Navy, explains to the FUhrer the S-boat operations on the nights of 17 and 18 March. In conclusion the Commander in Chief, Navy, reports as follows:
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a. It was correct to continue building the offensive type of S-boat and not to give in to the numerous suggestions for constructing a defensive S-boat.
b. The mass employment of S-boats scatters enemy defenses, so that some of the S-boats are able to attack because others are engaging the enemy escort forces and thus diverting them from the object to be protected.
c. Torpedoes have proven more successful than mines. Therefore their use should under no circumstances be given up in favor of mines.
d. The S-boats stand good chances of success even in poor visibility. The enemy is handicapped when he has to depend on locating devices only without being able to see, and his defenses are considerably less effective. Supposedly it was proven that S-boats cannot operate successfully when visibility is less than 2,000 meters and have to discontinue operations under such circumstances. This assumption, which had come to be accepted in practice, has been proved erroneous.
e. The S-boat coramanders have generally made the mistake of establishing principles for the operation of S-boats which were not adequately substantiated, but to which they adhered obstinately. The Commander in Chief, Navy, has intervened and has done away with such rigid conceptions. The recent successful activity of the S-boats shows that this effort has been worth while and has proved useful to S-boat operations.
9. The Commender in Chief, Navy, reports to the Führer that he has transferred the Naval Command, West, from Bad Schwalbach to Lindau, since the front was too close to permit its proper functioning. There is at the moment no other location available. However the Commander in Chief, Navy, believes that closer connection between Naval Command, West, and the Commanding General, West, is necessary in the long run, and he intends to transfer Naval Command, West, to the vicinity of the Commanding General, West, as soon as suitable headquarters are available.
Admiral on Special Duty with Commander in Chief of the Kriegsmarine
Conference of the Commander in Chief, Navy, with the Führer on 21 March 1945 at 1600.
1. The Führer emphasizes once more the importance of giving the Northern Army Group and especially the 2nd Army priority in the shipment of adequate ammunition. The Commander in Chief, Navy, states that according to today's report, 1,690 tons of ammunition arrived in Pillau, 454 tons in Gotenhafen, and an additional 233 tons are expected in Gotenhafen. Furthermore the Führer confirms his decision of 20 March that the 4th Army shall hold its bridgehead and will not be evacuated. However, all artillery that can be spared is to be withdrawn via Rosenberg-Pillau. In this connection the Commander in Chief, Navy, comments that all available barges are being concentrated at Pillau for this purpose.
2. The Commander in Chief, Navy, reports with the aid of a map on the defenses of the Ems estuary toward the sea. He shows that the Ems can be considered well defended, and that a landing attempt in this coastal area is expected to cost the enemy severe losses. In reply to the Führer's question, the Commander in Chief, Navy, reports that he thinks an enemy landing on the West Frisian Islands very unlikely, since there is frequently surf, and the shallow tidal areas between the islands and the continent are unfavorable for landings.
Admiral on Special Duty with Commander in Chief of the Kriegsmarine
Conference of the Commander in Chief, Navy, with the Führer on 23 March 1945 at 1600.
(Note : The Commander in Chief, Navy, did not attend the Führer conference on 22 March 1945.)
1. The Commander in Chief, Navy, reports to the Führer that the evacuation of the 169th Infantry Division from Norway cannot be accomplished with the desired speed at present. This is due to the fact that recently four large transports, the ISAR , MARKO BRUNNER, TIJUKA, and the MAR DEL PLATA, were damaged and had to be withdrawn. In addition to the ferry boat PREUSSEN and the steamer INSTER, three additional ships of the Reich Commissioner of Shipping will be put into service on this transport assignment.
2. The Commander in Chief, Navy, comments on the successes of Submarine Commander Thomsen [U1202] between the Bank of Newfoundland and the Channel against a convoy coming from America on the great circle. Submarine Commander Thomsen's report confirms the assumption that enemy convoys use the shortest route, i.e. the great circle because of the present freedom of the high sea from submarine danger. The Commander in Chief, Navy, on the basis of this fact, intends to comb the great circle for enemy convoys at the beginning of April with submarines of Type IX C.
3. During the discussion of the situation in West Prussia, the Führer stated that he doubts that the Army Commander used the naval artillery as much as he should have during the Russian attack on Zoppot.
4. The ammunition problem of the Northern Army Group, especially of the 2nd Army, is once more the subject of discussion. The Commander in Chief, Navy, points out that the ammunition steamers for the 2nd and 4th Army and Army Group Samland will be assigned to the Northern Army Group, which can distribute the ammunition among the various areas as it sees fit. Several ammunition steamers are en route, or have already arrived. The Chief of the General Staff corroborates the statement made by the Commander in Chief, Navy; he reports, however, that a proper distribution of ammunition among the various armies of the northern Army Group cannot always be achieved because of the different types of artillery.
5. In connection with the Führer's order of 19 March in regard to the extent of destruction to be carried out in the Reich area, the Commander in Chief, Navy, requests a decision from the Führer on how the destruction of harbors and shipyards should be handled, since the situation is different than in the case of land objects. The Führer is of the opinion that here, too, decisions will have to be made from the standpoint of strategy and are therefore to be made by the authorities involved. He delegates to the Commander in Chief, Navy, the power to decide the extent to which all sea ports in the Reich area are to be destroyed, and the way in which it is to be done. The OKW will issue the necessary orders as suggested by the Commander in Chief, Navy.
Admiral on Special Duty with Commander in Chief of the Kriegsmarine
Conference of the Commander in Chief, Navy, with the Führer on 25 March 1945 at 1600.
(Note: The Commander in Chief, Navy, did not attend the Führer conference on 24 March 1945.)
1. During the report on the situation on the sector of Army Group, Vistula, the Commander in Chief, Navy, indicates that the Russians might attempt to break through the Dievenow position and occupy Swinemünde. Such action would eliminate a port which is indispensible to us. Therefore the Commander in Chief, Navy, believes that it is necessary to reinforce the defenses of the Dievenow sector with additional artillery and to raise the ammunition allotment which, according to reports by the local commanders, is too low. The Commander in Chief, Navy, explains in detail which batteries according to naval documents are at present in the Dievenow sector. The Führer orders that an exact artillery chart of this sector be submitted to him by the Army General Staff on 26 March so that he can then make a decision.
2. In view of the fact that the bridgehead of the 4th Army in East Prussia has been contracted further, the Commander in Chief, Navy, requests that the Balga Peninsula , from where Pillau is directly threatened, should be held as long as possible. The Führer agrees. He has decided that first of all the supernumerary heavy equipment, especially artillery, is to be removed from Rosenberg to Pillau, and that afterwards the evacuation of the divisions can get under way.
3. The Chief of the Army General Staff, Operations Division, Infantry General Krebs, asks the Führer to permit that in an emergency also soldiers, especially replacement battalions, may be transported on ammunition steamers. The Führer agrees to this proposal, but with the proviso it is done only in cases where no other solution is possible.
4. During the discussion of measures to destroy the Russian Oder bridges, the possibility of using "Greek fire" was brought up. The Commander in Chief, Navy, states in this connection that the Navy has already for some time conducted experiments along such lines, and that they will be concluded in about a week.
5. The Commander in Chief, Navy, again discusses with the Chief of Staff of the OKW, the problem of coal conservation in Norway. The Chief of Staff of the OKW, reports that a priority list for coal consumption in Norway has been set up, and that conservation of coal is being carried out wherever possible.
Admiral on Special Duty with Commander in Chief of the Kriegsmarine
Conference of the Commander in Chief, Navy, with the Führer on 26 March 1945 at 1600.
1. The Führer orders an investigation of the officers occupying the posts of fortification commanders in the Western Area. He states that these positions should be filled mainly by naval officers, since many fortifications have been given up, but no ships were ever lost without fighting to the last man (Compare Führer Conference 6 January 1943). This remark was caused by a report from the Channel Islands concerning a difference of opinion among the occupation troops in the matter of holding out to the last man. The Commander in Chief, Navy, informs the Führer that this situation has been remedied by the recent appointment of Vizeadmiral Hüffmeier as Admiral, Channel Islands, and that in most of the other fortifications in the West (except in Lorient and St. Nazaire) naval officers have been assigned to the posts of fortification commanders. (The Commander in Chief, Navy, repeats his earlier request to the Chief of the OKW concerning the replacement of the fortification commander of St. Nazaire, Generalmajor Jung, by the previous fortification commander, Generalmajor Hünten. Jung is handicapped by illness and there is no guarantee therefore that he can provide the necessary resistance.)
2. The developments in Danzig and Gotenhafen necessitate removing the wounded and refugees from these ports at once with all possible means, rather than evacuating Pillau. The Commander in Chief, Navy, reports this matter to the Führer, who agrees. The order to this effect is sent immediately to the Commanding Officer, Supply and Transports.
3. Russian successes against the bridgeheads at Rosenberg make it necessary to transfer the troops without heavy equipment across the Haff to Pillau as soon as possible. The Navy is unable to furnish any additional vessels for the crossing, since some of the naval barges have to be used for shuttle traffic between Gotenhafen and Danzig.
4. The Chief of the Army General Staff reports to the Führer that altogether 118 guns of 7.5 cm. caliber and more are in use on the Dievenow front and that sixty additional 7.5 cm. antitank guns are on the way. These figures coincide with those given by the Naval Shore Commander, Pomerania. The Führer is of the opinion that this artillery should be adequate.
5. The Commander in Chief, Navy, and the Deputy Chief of the OKW, Operations Staff, General Winter, discuss the following matters concerning the Norwegian area on the basis of the recent report by the Commanding Admiral, Norway, Admiral Ciliax:
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a. The Navy needs the class I emergency units as infantry protection for the coastal batteries, since the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Norway, did not provide adequate infantry protection.
b. A decision must be reached at once concerning the problem of base commanders of the coastal batteries in Norway. The Commander in Chief, Navy, is of the opinion that the ruling by the Commanding General of the Narvik Army Group, making the commanding officer of the infantry defense forces also the base commander in every case, is not acceptable to the Navy. Generalmajor Winter promises an early report on the decision of the OKW.
c. As to the problem of delegating overall command authority to Army commanders below the rank of division commanders, which runs counter to Führer Directive No. 40, Generalmajor Winter reports that due to the extensive territory in Norway such measures cannot always be avoided. The Commander in Chief, Navy, agrees.
Admiral on Special Duty with Commander in Chief of the Kriegsmarine
Conference of the Commander in Chief, Navy, with the Führer on 28 March 1945 at 1600.
(Note: On 27 March 1945 the Commander in Chief, Navy, did not attend the Führer conference.)
1. The Commander in Chief, Navy, presents to the Führer a general view of the coal situation on the coast, and its effects on naval operations. Due to the fact that for about a week no coal has arrived from the Ruhr area, a great coal shortage will result within the next few days. Only about 900 tons of coal will be available per day according to present estimates (400 tons from Lower Silesia and 500 tons from the mining area Ibbenbueren), while the daily requirements for the Navy and the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping in the home zone amount to 6,200 tons of coal. The 900 tons of coal are just enough to permit the shipment of supplies to Army Group, Kurland and the Northern Army Group, and include the amount of coal required to move and safeguard the coal itself. Therefore coal-burning vessels will no longer be available for troop transports, for the evacuation of the wounded and of refugees; all this will have to be confined to the oil-burning ships at hand. It will amount to a 50 % decrease in shipping space. In addition, the operation of all coal-burning escort ships in the remaining sea areas will have to be suspended. The Chief of the OKW is endeavoring to increase coal deliveries to the Navy and hopes that he can arrange for daily shipments amounting to 4,000 tons of pit coal (2,000 tons from Denmark and 1,000 tons each from Lower Silesia and Westphalia) and 4,000 tons of brown coal.
(For the time being the Commander in Chief, Navy, will not order convoy escorts and merchant ships to suspend operations - a move which would have serious consequences in any case. Rather he prefers to await developments, hoping that the Chief of the OKW will succeed in alleviating the coal shortage.)
2. On 27 March the Führer wanted to know whether submarines could be used for the purpose of sending supplies to Army Group, Kurland. In reply to this question transmitted to him by the Admiral at Führer Headquarters, the Commander in Chief, Navy, explains as follows: Submarines must limit their load to fifty tons in the Baltic Sea because of water conditions there; round trip takes at least six days - without making allowances for possible delays. In order to move sufficient quantities of supplies, so many submarines would be required that submarine warfare would practically come to a standstill. Therefore the Commander in Chief, Navy, will not approve such a plan, at least not as long as regular supply ships have a chance of reaching Kurland and as long as they suffer only occasional losses. The Führer agrees with this, desires, however, that in special cases submarines be used to transport items of special value (for instance tank parts). The Commander in Chief, Navy, replies that this can be done without great difficulties. (It remains to be seen, however, whether or not it may be better to dispatch such supplies on a destroyer or a S-boat. Decisions in each case will be made in accordance with the circumstances.)
3. A lengthy discussion developed between the Führer and the Commander in Chief, Navy, on the suitability of the various types of vessels built in the course of the expansion of the German Navy prior to the war. The Commander in Chief, Navy, believes that it was a mistake to build battleships instead of concentrating on the construction of a much larger number of submarines. Our enemies had such a lead in the field of battleship construction, that it was impossible for us to overtake them. A superior submarine force would have given us a much better chance to end this war in our favor within a short time.
Admiral on Special Duty with Commander in Chief of the Kriegsmarine
Conference of the Commander in Chief, Navy, with the Führer on 30 March 1945 at 1630.
(Note: The Commander in Chief, Navy, did not attend the Führer conference on 29 March 1945.)
1. The Commander in Chief, Navy, reports to the Führer that the 2nd Naval Infantry Division is expected to be fully equipped in about a week and will be ready for transfer soon thereafter. He requests instructions to what area the division is then to be sent for continuation of training. The Chief of Staff of the OKW asks whether it might not be better to send the division to the Emden area contrary to present plans. He proposes this in view of recent developments. The Führer remarks that he will make the decision shortly before the transfer is made.
2. Following the report by the Chief of the Army General Staff, Operations Division, concerning the order to hold the Hel Peninsula, the Commander in Chief, Navy, proposes that this peninsula be reinforced with artillery, especially medium caliber anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns, since the long promontory offers the enemy opportunities for landing attempts from the Zatoka Pucka. Such attempts can only be combatted with an adequate number of rapid firing weapons. The Führer agrees with this request, and directs the Chief Army Liaison Officer with the OKW, General Buhle, to take the necessary measures.
3. The Commander in Chief, Navy, refers back to a report given by the Chief of the Army General Staff at the Führer conference on 29 March about the alleged attempt of the Norwegian tanker GERDMOOR to escape from Pillau to Sweden. He reports to the Führer that the tanker is proceeding according to schedule in a special convoy en route to Libau. The report of the attempted escape was evidently an error.
4. The report on the situation on the Western Front indicates that American forces have reached the Dortmund-Ems Canal and some crossed it near Ladbergen. The Commander in Chief, Navy, adds that the Todt Organization has already stopped reconstructing the canal and building the narrow-gauge field railroad for the circumvention of the damaged section in view of strong interference by the enemy air force.
5. The Chief of Staff of the OKW reports that isolation of the Dutch redoubt must be considered a possibility since the developments on the northern sector of the Western Front are becoming continuously more unfavorable. He therefore recommends supplying this area with weapons and ammunition, if this is found necessary, so long as land communications remain open. In this connection the Commander in Chief, Navy, remarks that the shipment of supplies to the Dutch area by sea is chiefly a coal problem. The present acuteness of the coal situation along the coast eliminates all prospects of making coal available for additional supply operations. The Commander in Chief, Navy, intends to establish a priority list covering coal distribution, in order to use the bunker coal, which is available only in limited quantities, with the greatest efficiency. First priority will be given to the maintenance of the sea routes in the Baltic Sea, in the Skagerrak, and to the supply of Army Group, Kurland and the Northern Army Group. Next on the list of priorities will be the troop transports from Norway to Denmark. All other tasks will have to be set aside in favor of the aforementioned.
6. A strong unit of our own torpedo bombers is reported to have overshot a QP convoy which had been located several hours previously by air reconnaissance. This evokes a discussion of the commitment of air units against targets in the open sea. The Commander in Chief, Navy, explains that according to the experience gained in the Bay of Biscay from cooperation with the Air Commander, Atlantic Coast, such an assignment requires crews with especially thorough training and long experience. In order to locate an enemy convoy correctly it is necessary to have continuous air reconnaissance, which can guide our own planes to the target by constantly broadcasting the position of the convoy. In this case the reconnaissance report was sent at 1200 and no contact was maintained; therefore the attack unit, which did not arrive till 2000 at the assumed location of the convoy, had no chance of finding the target. The Führer expresses the opinion that special locating planes should be provided to guide the approach of the attack unit, and that the locating devices of the Air Force still fall short of expectations. This handicap remains despite the fact that the British locating device fell into our hands years ago. According to reports of the Commander in Chief, Navy, the Navy has at its disposal 120 new locating devices, which are copies of the British model. These, however, are too heavy and too big for our planes.
7. The Commander in Chief, Navy, submits to the Führer a report about the bomb hits on submarine pen "Valentine" [in Bremen]. Two heavy high-explosive bombs (the type of the bombs has not yet been fully determined) hit and penetrated the top of the pen. The ceiling had partly been reinforced to seven meters, but unfortunately these bombs struck a place of the pen which had not yet been reinforced and was only 4.5 meters thick. However, the power of the bombs was completely spent by the penetration, so that the interior of the submarine pen remained undamaged.
8. The Commander in Chief, Navy, informs the Chief of the Army High Command, Operations Division, that in an emergency a certain amount of Otto carburetor fuel can be supplied by destroyers or submarines to cut-off army groups. The quantities are, however, very small, since the ship bunkers cannot be utilized. The entire shipment has to be made in barrels and metal cans. One submarine can transport about 35 to 40 cu.m., and one destroyer about 50 cu.m. on each trip. In the case of destroyers, half of the cargo must be packed in barrels and half in metal cans; in the case of submarines exclusively in metal cans.
9. The Führer raises the question whether the staff of the Northern Army Group can be dispensed with after the loss of the Balga Peninsula and the isolation of the remaining bridgeheads in the area of the Gulf of Danzig. He asks the Commander in Chief, Navy, whether he thinks that this army group is needed to cooperate with the Navy in the execution of supply problems. The Commander in Chief, Navy, replies that it would be helpful to have an authority which would handle the supply problems in the Gulf of Danzig collectively. However, more important to him is an authority which has full insight into the supply situation of the various defense sectors along the Gulf of Danzig, which could supervise priorities, and check the assignment of arriving ships. The ensuing conversation shows that this task could be handled by the Quartermaster General in the Zone of the Interior. Therefore retention of the staff of the Northern Army Group is not necessary for regulating supplies.
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